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Fishing for Evidence: The Expansive
Warrantless Search Powers of Fish and
Game Wardens
Introduction
Fish and game wardens1 are unique among law enforcement officers.
They are hybrids, at once police officers and administrative inspectors.
Because of this dual role, they combine the Fourth Amendment search
powers of police departments and of regulatory agencies. While this
combination gives wardens greater ability to conduct warrantless
searches than either the police or administrative inspectors, it may also
erode the constitutional protections of those subject to wardens' searches.
The result is a constitutional dilemma-a tension between the individ-
ual's right to privacy and the state's interest in law enforcement and in
protecting the environment.
States have taken a variety of approaches in an effort to resolve these
conflicting interests. Some states favor the individual, either by com-
pletely eliminating game wardens' statutory search authority,2 or by
holding warrantless game searches to the same probable cause standard
which applies to the traditional exceptions to the Fourth Amendment
warrant requirement.3 This approach frustrates state efforts to control
1. The states use a variety of terms to describe game wardens. Whether they are called
"conservation rangers," as in Georgia, "wildlife agents," as in Washington, or more tradition-
ally "fish and game wardens," as in California and Alabama, their function is essentially the
same: to enforce state laws protecting wildlife. GA. CODE ANN. § 45-116 (Supp. 1985);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 77.12.070 (West Supp. 1984); CAL. FISH & GAME CODE § 854
(Deering 1976); ALA. CODE § 39-2-65 (1980). This Note uses the term "game warden" to
encompass all such officers.
2. For example, the Michigan Supreme Court has held that statutes authorizing warrant-
less game searches violate the Michigan Constitution. People v. Younger, 327 Mich. 410, 42
N.W.2d 120 (1950).
3. E.g., Hill v. State, 238 So. 2d 608 (Fla. 1970); see also LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 56:55
(West Supp. 1985). Cf State v. Marshall, 147 Mont. 278, 570 P.2d 909 (1977) (reversing
conviction because warden's observations did not give probable cause to search). For the
traditional exceptions to the warrant requirement, see infra text accompanying notes 71-144.
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fish and game violations.4 Undetected violations could cost the states
millions of dollars and cause incalculable damage to wildlife and natural
resources.
5
Recognizing the importance of warrantless game searches, some
states attempt a compromise between state and individual interests: they
grant the wardens power to search but protect the individual by restrict-
ing that power. Some limit search powers by restricting wardens' juris-
diction to the enforcement of fish and game law.6  This
compartmentalization of authority, however, hampers law enforcement
in the rural and wilderness areas that game wardens generally patrol 7-
the areas which most need law enforcement assistance.' Furthermore,
many ostensibly nongame crimes harm the environment.9 Another
method of limiting game wardens' powers is to provide civil remedies
against wardens who exceed constitutional limits while conducting
searches.1" Yet the effectiveness of civil suits is doubtful. In the jurisdic-
tions permitting suit, courts are often unwilling to hold game wardens'
actions unreasonable. 1
Those jurisdictions which neither eliminate nor restrict game war-
dens' search powers have not established a satisfactory constitutional ba-
sis for those powers. Some courts have relied on implied consent,12 but
this notion of consent may be fictional rather than factual. 13 Some courts
4. W. RINGEL, SEARCHES & SEIZURES, ARRESTS AND CONFESSIONS § 14.3(b), at 14-16
(2d ed. 1984).
5. See Twenty-four Arrested for Illegal Sales of Fish, San Francisco Chron., Feb. 26,
1985, at 1, 20, col. 6; see also United States v. Greenhead, Inc., 256 F. Supp. 890 (N.D. Cal.
1966) (lamenting the passing of the passenger pigeon and "the ever decreasing call of the wild
duck").
6. See W. RINGEL, supra note 4, § 14.4(d), at 14-30; see also Department of Natural
Resources v. Padgett, 146 Ga. App. 121, 245 S.E.2d 480 (1978); Note, Search and Seizure;
Statutory Authorization of Searches for Game, 14 S.D.L. REv. 388, 393-94 (1969) (proposing
that wardens' authority be entirely civil).
7. Betchart v. Department of Fish and Game, 158 Cal. App. 3d 1104, 1109-10, 205 Cal.
Rptr. 135, 138 (1984); State v. Tourtillott, 289 Or. 835, 858, 618 P.2d 423, 430 (1980).
8. CALIFORNIA STATE ATrORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COM-
MISSION ON NARCOTICS, FINAL REPORT 16 (1984) [hereinafter cited as NARCOTICS REPORT].
9. Id. at 13.
10. See, e.g., Davis v. Reynolds, 319 F. Supp. 20 (N.D. Fla. 1970); Dickens v. Debolt, 288
Or. 3, 602 P.2d 246 (1979).
11. See, e.g., Prochaska v. Marcoux, 632 F.2d 848 (10th Cir. 1980): Davis v. Reynolds,
319 F. Supp. 20 (N.D. Fla. 1970); Betchart v. Department of Fish and Game, 158 Cal. App.
3d 1104, 205 Cal. Rptr. 135 (1984).
12. See W. RINGEL, supra note 4, § 14.4(d), at 14-31.
13. Cf Note, The Assumption of Risk Doctrine: Erosion of Fourth Amendment Protection
Through Fictitious Consent to Search and Seizure, 22 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1051, 1083
(1982). The author criticizes the notion that persons speaking to electronically monitored
informers "consent" to such surveillance. Noting that many persons are unaware of the risk
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have theorized that hunters waive their Fourth Amendment rights while
hunting; 14  commentators have found this argument similarly
unpersuasive. 
1 5
This Note explores the unresolved tension between state and private
interests resulting from the enhanced search powers of game wardens.
The note begins by examining the administrative component of the game
warden's search powers. It then discusses the traditional law enforce-
ment bases for game searches, demonstrating the potential for abuse
which results from the combination of the two search areas. Finally, the
Note considers a possible resolution of the constitutional dilemma: it
proposes that the reasonableness standard of the recent Supreme Court
case, New Jersey v. T.L.O., 16 be applied to fish and game related searches.
In analyzing the T.L 0. standard, the Note extracts guidelines that might
provide suitable standards for balancing the state's interests in environ-
mental protection and law enforcement against the individual's interest
in freedom from unreasonable searches.
I. The Role of State Game Wardens in Law Enforcement
Game wardens have been a fixture of American wildlife manage-
ment since the mid-1800's.17 There are more than 5,000 state game war-
dens exercising authority over vast expanses of land throughout the
United States.18 Although all game wardens are charged with adminis-
tering and enforcing wildlife protection law, the extent of their additional
authority differs from state to state. Some states view game wardens as
administrative officials whose powers are limited to enforcement of wild-
life law. 9 Others allow wardens to enforce not only wildlife laws, but
also any state laws violated on state-managed land or in the presence of a
warden.2° Some states make the warden a full peace officer, empowered
that the words are recorded, the commentator called such consent "fictitious." Id. at 1067.
Since many wilderness users are unaware of the possibility that they may be searched, their
consent may be equally fictitious.
14. See People v. Younger, 327 Mich. 410, 42 N.W.2d 120 (1950).
15. See Statutory Authorization for Searches for Game, supra note 6, at 390-91.
16. 105 S. Ct. 733 (1985).
17. Coggins & Ward, The Law of Wildlife Management on the Federal Public Lands, 60
OR. L. REV. 59, 62 (1981).
18. Id. at 115. In California alone, the State Department of Fish and Game manages over
100 million acres of land, 5,000 lakes, 30,000 miles of streams and rivers, and a 1,100 mile
coast. 3 CAL. REGULATORY L. REP. 91 (Spring 1983).
19. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 9-2-65 (1980); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 77.12.070 (West
Supp. 1984).
20. GA. CODE ANN. § 45-120 (Supp. 1984); IND. CODE ANN. § 14-3-4-9 (West 1983).
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to enforce all laws throughout the state.21 Finally, a state may not have
game wardens, but may charge its state police with enforcement of wild-
life law.2 2 Thus, in many states, game wardens are both administrators
and police officers.
With this combination of roles, game wardens will inevitably expand
their law enforcement activities beyond the narrow scope of fish and
game law. As the Florida Court of Appeal has noted:
There can be no doubt that the preservation of Florida's most pre-
cious Everglades, and its animal, aquatic and plant life, is not as-
sisted by the presence of an ever increasing swarm of criminals, in
airplanes, motor vehicles and boats going about their dirty business
and disturbing, for profit, the very peace and solitude which the
[Fish and Game] Commission seeks to uphold.23
To combat this "swarm of criminals" which may operate in rural areas
or public parks, state courts and legislatures have willingly extended
game wardens' authority to nongame regions and nongame law.24
Drug law enforcement is a natural extension of game wardens' du-
ties. Drug production is an increasingly difficult problem for law en-
forcement officials.2 Large rural areas are most susceptible to
clandestine drug producing operations, but are ill-equipped to cope with
the problem.26 Furthermore, drug production, especially marijuana
growing, is an "environmental crime" which results in pollution, clear-
cutting, reduction in the size of wildlife habitats, and restriction of public
21. See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 7053(G)(3) (1980); W. VA. CODE § 20-7-
4(1) (1981). Some states may require additional training. In California, for example, there are
both fish and game wardens, responsible primarily for enforcement of the fish and game laws,
and officers of the Wildlife Protection Branch, who are empowered to enforce general state law
if properly trained. CAL. FISH & GAME CODE §§ 856, 878 (Deering 1976). See also LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 56:108(H) (West Supp. 1984).
22. OR. REv. STAT. ANN. § 496.605 (1973).
23. State v. Howard, 411 So. 2d 372, 375 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
24. The following are but a few examples in which courts have upheld game wardens'
authority to police nongame laws: State v. Howard, 411 So. 2d 372 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982)
(smuggling); Anderson v. State, 133 Ga. App. 45, 209 S.E.2d 665 (1974) (drugs); Christopher
v. State, 639 S.W.2d 932 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982) (drugs); State v. Boggess, 309 S.E.2d 118 (W.
Va. 1983) (drugs). See also CAL. FISH & GAME CODE § 856; IND. CODE ANN. 14-3-4-9 (West
1983); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, 7053 (1983). But cf ALA. CODE § 9-2-65 (1980) (fish
and game wardens are limited to enforcement of fish and game law); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 97.50(2) (West Supp. 1984); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 23-7-101 (1977). In Louisiana, the state
supreme court declared that wildlife agents (game wardens) could not enforce drug laws. It
restricted the agents' authority to game-related law. State v. Longlois, 374 So. 2d 1208 (La.
1979). The legislature responded by passing a statute which expanded the agents' powers to
those of full peace officers, provided that the agents were trained. LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 56:108(H) (West Supp. 1984).
25. NARCOTICS REPORT, supra note 8, at 9.
26. Id. at 16.
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access to wilderness areas.2 7
Game wardens patrol the rural areas and state-managed lands
which are plagued by drug-related problems. They can search areas nor-
mally inaccessible to regular law enforcement officials.28 Wardens have
already come under indirect pressure to cooperate in drug-related law
enforcement.29 Indeed, game wardens already have proved successful in
making drug-related arrests.3°
Smuggling is another crime that game wardens might combat.
Smugglers enter the United States in a variety of ways. They may come
by sea,3 1 straining the resources of the Coast Guard.32 They may come
over land, through unpopulated areas where the United States Border
Patrol is thinly spread. 33 Latin American drug smugglers often come by
air, landing on isolated rural airstrips as far inland as Kentucky, Tennes-
see, and the Colorado Rockies.34
Because game wardens patrol both coastal and isolated areas, 35 they
are well positioned to observe smugglers in action. Under their warrant-
less search authority, wardens can search suspected smugglers more eas-
ily than can conventional law enforcement officers.3 6 In fact, game
wardens have already demonstrated their ability to combat smuggling.
37
There are a number of law enforcement areas in which game war-
dens could be effective. Whether by virtue of their presence in otherwise
unpoliced areas, or because of their expanded search powers, they can be
effective in the enforcement of such diverse fields as litter law, motor
vehicle regulation, immigration, and firearm abuse.3 8
27. Id. at 13.
28. See infra notes 71-159 and accompanying text.
29. NARCOTICS REPORT, supra note 8, at 17. The Commission has called for increased
participation by all law enforcement agencies to combat California's increasing drug problems.
Id.
30. See, e.g., United States v. Stricklin, 534 F.2d 1386 (10th Cir. 1976); Brown v. State, 5
Ark. App. 181, 636 S.W.2d 286 (1982); State v. Howard, 411 So. 2d 372 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1982); Anderson v. State, 133 Ga. App. 45, 209 S.E.2d 665 (1974); Christopher v. State, 639
S.W.2d 932 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982); State v. Boggess, 309 S.E.2d 118 (W. Va. 1983).
31. Feeding America's Habit, NEWSWEEK 22 (Feb. 25, 1985).
32. NARCOTICS REPORT, supra note 8, at 18.
33. Comment, Immigration Roving Border Patrols: The Less Than Probable Cause Stan-
dard for a Stop, 10 AM. J. CRIM. L. 245 (1982). See also NEWSWEEK, supra note 31, at 22.
34. NEWSWEEK, supra note 31, at 22.
35. See 3 CAL. REGULATORY L. REP. 91 (Spring 1985).
36. See notes 71-159 and accompanying text.
37. E.g., Call v. United States, 417 F.2d 462 (9th Cir. 1969); Dodds v. State, 434 So. 2d
940 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
38. There are, however, obstacles to this expansion. One problem is financial: often,
funds are unavailable even for fish and game operations. See San Francisco Chron., supra note
5, at 1, col. 1.
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II. Fourth Amendment Analysis of Game Warden Searches
A. Administrative Component
Wildlife management is largely a matter of administration.3 9 It in-
volves not only hunting and fishing regulation, but political considera-
tions, economic analysis, land management and habitat manipulation.'
It is therefore not surprising that some courts have said that the field of
wildlife protection is regulatory and administrative in nature.4"
The Supreme Court has recognized the need for flexibility in admin-
istrative searches, subjecting these searches to a relaxed standard of
Fourth Amendment review. In Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc.42 the Court
held that the level of probable cause needed to obtain an administrative
search warrant is lower than the level of probable cause needed for a
criminal search warrant. 3 In effect Marshall and related Supreme Court
decisions have created a new standard of probable cause for administra-
tive searches, a standard lower than the traditional criminal standard.'
In addition to lowering the standard of probable cause for adminis-
trative warrants, the Supreme Court has dispensed with the warrant re-
quirement altogether for some administrative searches. In United States
v. Biswel 45 and Colonnade Corp. v. United States,46 the Court ruled that
searches of the premises of pervasively regulated industries are exempt
from the warrant requirement in some instances. The Biswell-Colonnade
exception has three elements. First, the exception applies only to heavily
regulated enterprises, such as mining,' firearms sales,48 and liquor
sales.49 The warrantless intrusion is justified in part by the reduced ex-
pectation of privacy of those participating in closely regulated
industries.50
39. Coggins & Ward, supra note 17, at 71.
40. See generally id.
41. People v. Di Bernardo, 79 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 5, 144 Cal. Rptr. 902 (1978); State v.
Tourtillott, 289 Or. 835, 865-66, 618 P.2d 423, 434 (1980).
42. 436 U.S. 307 (1978).
43. Id. at 320.
44. Comment, The Warrant Requirement for OSHA Inspections: The Supreme Court Es-
tablishes a Two-Tiered Test for Probable Cause, 15 WILLAMET-IFE L.J. 61 (1978); see also Com-
ment, OSHA Inspections and the Fourth Amendment: The Uncertainties Continue, 32 U. KAN.
L. REv. 457, 461-62 (1984).
45. 406 U.S. 311 (1972).
46. 397 U.S. 72 (1970).
47. Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594 (1981).
48. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311.
49. Colonnade, 397 U.S. 72.
50. Dewey, 452 U.S. at 608 (Rehnquist, J., concurring); Biswell, 406 U.S. at 316.
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Second, Biswell-Colonnade requires the balancing of a participant's
expectation of privacy against the importance of the governmental inter-
est involved." The administrative agency must justify its search not only
by showing that the competing interests weigh in favor of the search, but
also that a warrant requirement would frustrate the fulfillment of the
asserted interest.
5 2
Finally, the search must be conducted under the authority of a valid
statute.3 The statute must be carefully drawn to provide notice to those
likely to be searched and to control officials conducting the searches.54 It
must serve as a constitutionally adequate substitute for a warrant."
Fish and game searches appear to fulfill the three Biswell-Colonnade
requirements. First, hunting and fishing are highly regulated and have
been so for over a century.5 6 Because this regulation reduces the out-
doorsman's reasonable expectation of privacy, administrative interfer-
ence with hunting and fishing has been found "relatively unobtrusive.
57
Second, the state interest in protecting the environment weighs heavily
against the individual privacy expectations of hunters and fishermen. 8
Finally, most state statutory schemes authorize game wardens to search
without a warrant for evidence of game violations.59
Although courts have used the Biswell-Colonnade exception to jus-
tify game searches,6" this analysis does not settle the constitutional issue.
Courts have used the exception primarily for commercial industries, such
as commercial fishing companies6 and private hunting clubs.62 Courts
may be more reluctant to uphold warrantless searches of individuals.63
51. Dewey, 452 U.S. at 601-02.
52. Id. at 603. Thus, a strong federal interest in mine safety was substantial enough to
justify warrantless inspections in Dewey. Id. at 602.
53. Biswell, 406 U.S. at 315.
54. Id. at 317.
55. Dewey, 452 U.S. at 603. The statute must reduce the discretion vested in officers,
thereby minimizing any possibility of abuse. Id. at 599; Biswell, 406 U.S. at 317.
56. Coggins & Ward, supra note 17, at 62.
57. W. RINGEL, supra note 4, § 14.4(d), at 14-31.
58. See Baldwin v. Fish and Game Comm'n, 436 U.S. 371, 391 (1978). See also Hughes v.
Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 337 (1979); Note, Constitutional Law-The End of a Wildlife Era:
Hughes v. Oklahoma, 60 OR. L. REv. 413, 426 (1981).
59. See I J. VARON, SEARCHES, SEIZURES AND IMMUNmES 643 (2d ed. 1974).
60. See, e.g., United States v. Raub, 637 F.2d 1205 (9th Cir. 1980); People v. Di Bernardo,
79 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 5, 144 Cal. Rptr. 902 (1978).
61. United States v. Kaiyo Maru No. 53, 699 F.2d 989 (9th Cir. 1983); United States v.
Raub, 637 F.2d 1205 (9th Cir. 1980).
62. United States v. Greenhead, Inc., 256 F. Supp. 890 (N.D. Cal. 1966).
63. See Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967) (housing inspector has no au-
thority to make warrantless inspection of private residence).
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Thus, the Biswell-Colonnade exception may not apply to the private
hunter or fisherman.
There is another difficulty in applying the exception to commercial
fish or game searches. Typically, game statutes authorize searches when
the warden has reason to believe that game laws have been violated. 
6
This allows the warden considerable discretion in deciding when to
search. Biswell-Colonnade, however, requires that administrative search
statutes be structured to minimize discretion and abuse by officers and to
maximize notice to potential subjects of searches. 6 Nevertheless, this
requirement may not be fatal to warrantless game searches. The
Supreme Court has tolerated the use of discretion in some recent search
and seizure cases, leaving disturbingly vague standards for searches con-
ducted under the Biswell-Colonnade exception.
66
B. Criminal Law Enforcement Search Analysis
In many jurisdictions, game wardens have the power to enforce
criminal laws as well as fish and game laws.67 Accordingly, many fish
and game wardens have the search powers of police officers in addition to
their administrative search powers,68 including the power to search with-
out a warrant under some circumstances.6 9 This combination of powers
gives game wardens greater search and seizure capabilities than either
police officers or administrative inspectors. Game wardens' powers are
used to great advantage under four of the traditional warrant exceptions:
post-arrest, investigative, automobile, and plain view searches.70 Game
wardens also have great search powers in two physical areas not nor-
mally within the province of the police: containers and vessels.
64. See, e.g., W. VA. CODE § 20-7-4(3) (1981).
65. Dewey, 452 U.S. at 599.
66. See United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S. 579 (1983) (affirming right of cus-
toms officials to board vessels at random). See also New Jersey v. T.L.O., 105 S. Ct. 733, 743-
44 (1985) (upholding teacher's discretion to search students). But see Camara, 387 U.S. 523
(restricting administrative authority to conduct warrantless searches of individual's home).
67. See supra notes 20-22 and accompanying text.
68. See supra notes 56-59 and accompanying text.
69. See infra notes 71-160 and accompanying text.
70. Traditional exceptions to the warrant requirement also include consent, Schneckloth
v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973), and exigent circumstances searches, United States v.
Santana, 427 U.S. 38 (1976); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966). Since wardens'
administrative authority gives them no special advantage in the use of these exceptions, they
are not discussed extensively in this Note.
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1. Traditional Warrant Exceptions
a. Search Incident to Arrest
The most common type of warrantless search occurs incident to
arrest.7 1 The Supreme Court clearly enunciated the doctrine in Chimel v.
California.72 The Court held that officers may conduct warrantless
searches of arrestees in order to ensure the safety of arresting officers and
to prevent the destruction of evidence.73
The doctrine has two requirements. First, the search must be inci-
dent to lawful arrest.74 The grounds for arrest can be minor as long as
the arrest is lawful.75 "Incident to arrest" means contemporaneous with
arrest: the police may not first search a suspect and then arrest her on
the basis of evidence discovered during the search.76 If, however, prob-
able cause to arrest exists before the search, the search is constitutional
even when the suspect has not been formally arrested.77
The second requirement is that searches incident to arrest be limited
to the arrestee's person and the area within her immediate control.7" Of-
ficers cannot use the exception to search an entire home, even if the
arrest takes place pursuant to an arrest warrant.79 The search, however,
need not take place at the arrest scene.8 0
The Chimel exception is especially useful in expanding game war-
dens' search powers. While the police generally make arrests only for
criminal or, in some instances, traffic violations,8 1 game wardens can also
make arrests for any of a great number of minor fish and game infrac-
tions.82 By lawfully arresting someone for a minor game violation, game
wardens can conduct an otherwise unlawful search for evidence of a
more serious crime.8 3
Game wardens have made good use of the search incident to arrest.
71. 2 W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 5.2(c), at 275 (1978).
72. 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
73. Id. at 762-63.
74. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973).
75. E.g., Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260, 266 (1973) (upholding search pursuant to
arrest for driving without a license).
76. Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 62-63 (1968).
77. Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 110-11 (1980).
78. Chimel, 395 U.S. at 762-63.
79. Id. at 763.
80. See Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640, 646 (1983) (upholding post-arrest search con-
ducted at police station).
81. See Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260, 266 (1973).
82. See, e.g., CAL. FISH & GAME CODE §§ 851, 856, 878, 1006 (West 1984).
83. Cf 2 W. LAFAVE, supra note 71, § 5.2(e), at 281-87 (explaining police use of arrests
for minor crimes as subterfuge to conduct otherwise illegal searches for evidence of serious
crimes).
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In Call v. United States, 84 a game warden saw two men landing a boat on
a beach late at night. He arrested one defendant on suspicion of illegal
lobster fishing. His subsequent search of the defendant and his accom-
plice uncovered a large amount of marijuana. The Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals upheld the search as incident to lawful arrest. Similarly, in
United States v. Stricklin"5 a game warden detained defendants for night
hunting.86 An incident search of the defendants revealed marijuana in a
sleeping bag. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the search and
resulting conviction. 7
b. Protective or Investigative Search
A common search technique employed by the police is to "stop and
frisk" suspicious individuals for carefully defined investigative or protec-
tive purposes.8" In Terry v. Ohio, 89 the Supreme Court upheld the consti-
tutionality of investigative searches. The Terry stop permits two levels of
investigation. First, an officer may briefly detain and question persons
acting in a suspicious manner.90 Second, an officer may conduct a lim-
ited search if there is reason to believe that the suspect is armed.9
An investigative stop need not be supported by probable cause. An
officer may detain a suspect if there is some "objective manifestation that
the person stopped is, or is about to be, engaged in criminal activity." 92
To find an "objective manifestation" of criminal activity, an officer must
make an assessment of likely criminal activity based on all the circum-
stances,93 and she must have particularized suspicion that the subject is
engaged in wrongdoing.94
84. 417 F.2d 462, 463-64 (9th Cir. 1969).
85. 534 F.2d 1386 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 831 (1977).
86. Night hunting is prohibited in many states. Any indicia of night hunting, such as the
use of car headlights to illuminate fields along a road, possession of infrared rifle scopes, pres-
ence of a person in an area where gunshots were heard at night, or other suspicious activity,
can provide grounds for a warden to stop or arrest a suspect for night hunting violations.
Schultz v. State, 437 So. 2d 670 (Ala. Crim. App. 1983); State v. Hillock, 384 A.2d 437 (Me.
1978); State v. Cowperthwaite, 354 A.2d 173 (Me. 1976); State v. Hermandson, 84 S.D. 208,
169 N.W.2d 255 (1969).
87. See also Anderson v. State, 133 Ga. App. 45, 209 S.E.2d 665 (1974) (sustaining con-
viction for possession of marijuana discovered following arrest by game wardens for boating
and fishing license violations).
88. 3 W. LAFAVE, supra note 71, § 9.2(f), at 36.
89. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
90. Id. at 30.
91. Id. at 29-30.
92. United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981).
93. Id. at 418.
94. Id. Suspicion may arise as a result of direct police observation, Terry, 392 U.S. at 30;
on information from an informant, Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146-47 (1972); on detec-
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The officer's initial suspicions only justify her questioning a suspect.
Under Terry, an officer may conduct a search only if she reasonably be-
lieves that the detainee may be dangerous." The search is restricted to a
"pat down"-a limited search of the detainee's outer clothing designed
to discover weapons.96
As with post-arrest searches, game wardens are in a better position
to take advantage of the Terry exception than their urban police counter-
parts. Many activities that would not normally manifest "criminal activ-
ity.., afoot" 97 in urban settings may be signs of fish or game violations
in the wild. As a result, game wardens might make Terry stops of per-
sons whose activites might not be suspicious at all when "viewed through
the eyes of an experienced [urban] police officer." '98
The courts have upheld game wardens' use of investigative searches
and stops. In Anderson v. State,99 game officials detained persons for in-
vestigation of possible fishing and boating violations. During the deten-
tion, the officials discovered marijuana. The court upheld the detention
and the subsequent admission of the marijuana into evidence. 1" In State
v. Hillock 01 a warden detained the occupants of a car on suspicion of
illegal night hunting. The court upheld the warden's suspicions because
the car was travelling after midnight on a little used road in an area
where deer were known to abound."0 2 The stop led to the seizure of
evidence of night hunting which was admitted in the prosecution. 10 3 In
Dodds v. State, 104 game wardens stopped the defendants on suspicion
that they had committed game violations. Because the wardens' observa-
tions gave them probable cause, the court upheld the subsequent search
which uncovered smuggled cocaine. 10 5
c. Automobile Searches
It is generally recognized that searches of automobiles are not sub-
tion of a person at the scene of a crime, 3 W. LAFAVE, supra note 71, § 9.3(c), at 69; or on the
basis of information received from police bulletins, id. See generally id. at 58-69.
95. Terry, 392 U.S. at 23-24.
96. Id. at 30-31.
97. Id. at 30.
98. J. CREAMER, THE LAW OF ARREST, SEARCH AND SEIZURE 9 (3d ed. 1980).
99. 133 Ga. App. 45, 209 S.E.2d 665 (1974).
100. Id. at 47-48, 209 S.E.2d at 667.
101. 384 A.2d 437 (Me. 1978).
102. Id. at 441.
103. Id.
104. 434 So. 2d 940, 942 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
105. Id.
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ject to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement.0 6 The Supreme
Court has recognized the exception because the individual's reasonable
expectation of privacy is reduced while she is in an automobile.1" 7 The
exception, however, does not give the police unqualified license to search
automobiles. The officer must have a reasonable suspicion to justify a
vehicle stop. ' 8 She may not stop cars at random. '09 Even after lawfully
stopping a car, the officer may conduct a search only if she has probable
cause to believe that the car contains evidence °10 or weapons."1 The
officer may search the passenger compartment and any containers within
the car only if she has probable cause to believe that they contain
evidence. 112
Although the police must rely on case law to justify an automobile
search, game wardens often have statutory blessing. In many states, fish
and game enforcement statutes specifically permit game wardens to in-
spect vehicles without a warrant.113 Some states require a showing of
probable cause that the search will reveal evidence of a game violation. 4
Others permit the search if the warden has "reason to believe" she will
106. Professor Moylan has criticized treatment of the automobile search as a separate cate-
gory of Fourth Amendment exception. "[The mere testimonial mention of the word 'automo-
bile' frequently provokes the judicial knee-jerk of all knee-jerks.... [Many judges] refuse to
grasp that the review of every search of an automobile and every seizure from an automobile
need not proceed under the so-called 'automobile exception.'" Moylan, The Plain View Doc-
trine: Unexpected Child of the Great "Search Incident" Geography Battle, 26 MERCER L. REV.
1047, 1089 (1975). Nevertheless, as Justice Powell has remarked, "The search of an automo-
bile is far less intrusive on the rights protected by the Fourth Amendment than the search of
one's person or of a building. This court 'has long distinguished between an automobile and a
home or office.'" Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 279 (1973) (Powell, J.,
concurring) (citations omitted). Cases from Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925), to
Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983), reinforce the validity of the automobile exception.
See also United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982); New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981);
Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970).
107. Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 590 (1974).
108. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 884 (1975).
109. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663 (1979).
110. Almeida-Sanchez, 413 U.S. at 274-75.
111. Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. at 1051.
112. Id. The constitutionality of a warrantless search of a vehicle's trunk is still unsettled.
See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. at 1053 (specifically declining to decide whether police can
search trunks without a warrant). See generally Comment, Constitutional Law-Search and
Seizure-Containers Within Automobiles-United States v. Ross, 29 N.Y.L. ScH. L. REv. 153
(1984).
113. E.g., ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 12 § 7053(2)D (1981); W. VA. CODE § 20-7-4(3)
(1981); Wyo. STAT. § 23-6-109 (1977). Note also that if there is no statutory authority, the
warden may be able to rely on the automobile exception in some instances.
114. E.g., LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 56:55 (West Supp. 1984).
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find such evidence. 1 5
In State v. Tourtillott, 1 6 the Oregon Supreme Court upheld a check-
point vehicle stop designed to detect game violations. The stop instead
revealed evidence of a criminal violation.1" 7 The court acknowledged
"that a roadblock created for the sole purpose of 'locating people [on
whom could be served] papers or warrants' is impermissible .... ,
Nevertheless, the court upheld the search and the defendant's conviction,
relying on fish and game statutes and on the state's interest in environ-
mental protection." 9 In People v. Johnson, 120 a game warden stopped a
car to determine whether rifles that were visible in the vehicle were
loaded. The court upheld the search under a fish and game statute
prohibiting possession of loaded guns in vehicles.
1 2 1
d. Plain View Observations
The Supreme Court has described the plain view doctrine as "an
extension of whatever the prior justification for an officer's 'access to an
object' may be" rather than as an independent exception to the warrant
requirement.12 2 The doctrine permits the escalation of otherwise limited
searches under other exceptions. In general, the plain view doctrine ap-
plies when an officer "is able to detect something by utilization of one or
more of his senses ....
Plain view observations may be divided into three categories:
"nonintrusive" observations, when an officer has an open view of the evi-
dence in a public or constitutionally unprotected area; 124 "pre-intrusive"
observations, when an officer outside a constitutionally protected area
sees evidence within;1 25 and "post-intrusive" observations of an officer
115. E.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 23-10-20 (West Supp. 1984); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 77.12.090 (1984).
116. 289 Or. 845, 618 P.2d 423 (1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 972 (1981).
117. The driver was driving on a revoked license. Id. at 847, 618 P.2d at 424.
118. Id. at 868, 618 P.2d at 435 (citations omitted).
119. Id. at 853-59, 618 P.2d at 427-30.
120. 108 Cal. App. 3d 175, 178-79, 166 Cal. Rptr. 419, 420-21 (1980).
121. Id. See CAL. FISH & GAME CODE § 2006 (Deering Supp. 1984). See also Davis v.
Reynolds, 319 F. Supp. 20 (N.D. Fla. 1970) (no violation of Fourth Amendment for game
warden to conduct warrantless search of automobile for hunting dogs and guns pursuant to
statute); State v. Engels, 2 N.J. Super. 126, 64 A.2d 897 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1949)
(pursuant to statute, game warden with reason to believe game violation had occurred allowed
to search automobile without warrant).
122. Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 738-39 (1983) (plurality opinion).
123. 1 W. LAFAVE, supra note 71, § 2.2, at 240.
124. Moylan, supra note 106, at 1097-98. "If [the officer] is on the outside [of a constitu-
tionally protected area] looking outside, nobody gives a constitutional damn." Id.
125. Id. at 1098. "If [the officer] is on the outside looking inside, he needs something extra
going for him." Id. at 1097.
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after she is legitimately inside a constitutionally protected area. 126 Pre-
intrusive observations generally require an officer to get a warrant before
she can seize any evidence.1 27 Because this note is primarily concerned
with warrantless searches, only the post-intrusive and the nonintrusive
observation are discussed.
The post-intrusive plain view doctrine has three requirements. First,
an observing officer must have justifiably intruded into a constitutionally
protected sphere. 128 Second, the officer must have probable cause to as-
sociate the property with criminal activity.1 29 Finally, discovery of the
evidence must be "inadvertent."
1 30
Game wardens' search powers are enhanced by the plain view doc-
trine because they have broader authority to intrude on otherwise consti-
tutionally protected areas. Their statutory authority to search for game
violations may justify an investigative stop that an urban police officer
might not make.131 As a result of such stops, wardens might be in legiti-
mate positions to observe evidence of nongame violations. In both
Schultz v. State1 32 and United States v. Stricklin, 1 33 wardens stopped
automobiles for suspected violations of night hunting laws. In each case
the court upheld the warden's plain view observation and seizure of
marijuana.
1 34
Nonintrusive observations also aid game wardens, most often under
the name of the open fields doctrine. The Supreme Court has ruled that
there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in open fields. 135 Open
fields include all outdoor land beyond the curtilage of a home. 136 The
126. Id. at 1097. See also Note, Criminal Procedure-Fourth Amendment Searches and
Seizures-Plain View Doctrine-Texas v. Brown, 67 MARQ. L. REv. 366, 368 n.4 (1984).
127. Moylan, supra note 106, at 1098.
128. An officer may justify her presence while executing a warrant, Coolidge v. New
Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 465 (1970), accompanying a person arrested without a warrant,
Washington v. Chrisman, 455 U.S. 1 (1982), stopping someone for minor infractions, Colorado
v. Bannister, 449 U.S. 1 (1980), or while she is legitimately on the premises under any of the
warrant exceptions. See generally 1 W. LAFAVE, supra note 71, § 2.2, at 242-43.
129. Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. at 724. Brown's "probable cause to associate the property
with criminal activity" appears to replace the Coolidge requirement that it be "immediately
apparent" that an item is contraband. Compare id. with Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 446.
130. Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 469. "Inadvertant" refers to those instances when "the discov-
ery is anticipated, where the police know in advance the location of the evidence and intend to
seize it" before any stop or inspection takes place. Id. at 470.
131. See supra notes 42-59 and accompanying text.
132. 437 So. 2d 670 (Ala. Crim. App. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1070 (1984).
133. 534 F.2d 1386 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 831 (1976).
134. Id. at 1390; 437 So. 2d at 674.
135. United States v. Oliver, 104 S. Ct. 1735, 1742 (1984).
136. Id. "Curtilage" means the land and buildings just next to a house. The term has been
variously explained. The Supreme Court of North Dakota has defined it as "that area near a
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doctrine applies to both private and public lands,'37 including fenced ar-
eas, wooded areas, beaches, waterways, and deserts.1 38 The exception
applies regardless of whether an officer's presence constitutes a technical
trespass. 39 An individual's attempts to secure privacy, whether by enclo-
sure, fencing, or sign-posting, create no legitimate privacy expectation.40
The open fields doctrine enhances the search powers of game war-
dens. Because their authority extends over predominantly rural or wil-
derness lands, the majority of their observations take place in open field
lands. Game wardens have made good use of the doctrine. In Betchart
v. California State Department of Fish and Game, '41 a game warden
made periodic warrantless inspections of private lands for evidence of
game violations. While patrolling, the warden climbed fences and ig-
nored the owner's protests. Relying on the open fields doctrine, the Cali-
fornia Court of Appeal upheld the warden's authority to search and
dismissed the landowner's suit against the warden. 42 Similarly, in
Brown v. State, ' 43 a warden climbed fences and crossed private lands in
search of game violations. Instead of game violations, he found mari-
juana plants. The court upheld his seizure of the plants under the open
fields doctrine.'"
dwelling, not necessarily enclosed, that generally includes buildings or other adjuncts used for
domestic purposes." State v. Larson, 343 N.W.2d 361, 363 (N.D. 1984). The Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals has held that "the outer limits of the curtilage are defined by the walls of the
remote outbuildings" on unfenced residential land. United States v. Williams, 581 F.2d 451,
454 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 972 (1979).
137. Oliver, 104 S. Ct. at 1741 n.10.
138. See I W. LAFAvE, supra note 71, § 2.4(a), at 332.
139. Oliver, 104 S. Ct. at 1743-44.
140. Id.
141. 158 Cal. App. 3d 1104, 1107-08, 205 Cal. Rptr. 135, 136-37 (1984). Betchart is not a
criminal case, and wardens found no evidence of violations or crimes committed. The action
was maintained by plaintiff landowner for declaratory relief to determine the right of game
wardens to enter and inspect the plaintiff's property without a warrant. Id.
142. Id. at 1107-08, 205 Cal. Rptr. at 136-37.
143. 5 Ark. App. 181, 636 S.W.2d 286 (1982).
144. Id. at 288-89. See also United States v. Swann, 377 F. Supp. 1305 (D. Md. 1974) (in
action for attempted illegal taking of migratory birds, court used open fields doctrine to admit
evidence that defendant was baiting waterfowl when the evidence was seized near a pond sev-
eral hundred yards from outbuildings).
Like the police officer, the game warden cannot search a home or its curtilage without a
warrant. See Langle v. Bingham, 447 F. Supp. 934 (D. Vt. 1978) (invalidating warden's search
of freezer in barn); Gonzalez v. State, 588 S.W.2d 355 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979) (invalidating
warden's search of outbuilding).
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2. Physical Areas of Game Warden Searches
a. Container Searches
Police officers have only limited power to search containers. The
Supreme Court has stated that "a person's expectations of privacy in per-
sonal luggage are substantially greater than [for example] in an automo-
bile." '14 5 It is unclear what, if any, constitutional protection containers
will retain,146 but it is clear that game wardens need be less concerned
than police officers with limitations on container searches.
Many states authorize game wardens to inspect, without warrants,
receptacles that may contain fish or game.147 Some states require prob-
able cause,14 8 while others require a reasonable belief that containers
hold evidence of game violations before search is permitted.149 Califor-
nia requires no suspicion whatsoever, permitting inspection of "all recep-
tacles, except the clothing actually worn by a person at the time of
inspection, where [fish or game] may be stored.... .""I Under the Cali-
fornia statute, fish and game wardens in People v. Maxwell were allowed
to search sacks carried by passengers getting off a boat, without a show-
ing of probable cause or reasonable suspicion. 51
145. United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 13 (1977); accord Arkansas v. Sanders, 442
U.S. 753 (1979).
146. Many commentators, relying on United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977), and
Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 (1979), argue that containers, particularly luggage, should
be exempt from warrantless search. See 3 W. LAFAVE, supra note 71, § 9.4(e), at 133. United
States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982), casts some doubt on the continued viability of the doc-
trine.
Ross upheld a warrantless search of containers inside an automobile. The Court noted
that the search was conducted pursuant to the driver's lawful arrest, and that the officers had
probable cause to believe that the luggage contained contraband. The Court characterized the
search as an automobile search, carefully distinguishing the Chadwick and Sanders searches as
luggage searches. Id. at 815.
Apparently, Ross leaves intact the Fourth Amendment protection of containers which are
outside an automobile. Professor LaFave contends that the Supreme Court will restrict the
protections of luggage should any relevant case come before it. 2 W. LAFAVE, supra note 71,
§ 9.3, at 67-68 (Supp. 1984). Professor LaFave expects the Court to adopt a new rule which
would continue to require warrants for searches of containers outside an arrestee's possession,
but would authorize the search of any container in the arrestee's possession during the arrest.
It would not be necessary to show that the arrestee could readily reach the contents of the
container or that any weapons might be in the container. It would make no difference if the
container were locked. Id. at 106-07.
147. ALA. CODE § 9-2-65 (1980); CAL. FIsH & GAME CODE § 1006 (Deering 1976); IND.
CODE ANN. § 14-3-4-9 (West 1983); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 4194 (1983); Wyo. STAT. § 23-
6-109 (1977).
148. E.g., LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 56:55 (West Supp. 1984).
149. E.g., N.J. REv. STAT. § 23:10-20 (Supp. 1984); W. VA. CODE § 20-7-4(3) (1981).
150. CAL. FISH & GAME CODE § 1006 (Deering 1976).
151. 275 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 1026, 1027-29, 80 Cal. Rptr. 86, 87-88 (1969).
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b. Searches of Vessels
Like containers, vessels are also more accessible to game wardens
than to police officers. Many states give game wardens statutory author-
ity to search vessels for evidence of fishing or hunting violations.15 This
authority extends to boats on inland waterways and along the state's
coast, if any.
153
Generally, wardens need little justification to stop vessels. Some ju-
risdictions permit stops of improperly registered vessels in inland wa-
ters.15 4 In coastal waters there may be no need to satisfy any standard of
suspicion. In United States v. Villamonte-Marquez,15 5 the Supreme
Court noted the impossibility of establishing fixed checkpoints at sea and
the great variety of registration procedures used by seagoing vessels. Ac-
cordingly, the Court permitted customs officers to board ships at random
in order to accomplish the important governmental interest of license
and registration inspection.
15 6
The scope of a vessel search is often limited. 157 Wardens are permit-
ted to board to check registration and licences.1 58 Once aboard, how-
ever, the warden is in a position to make plain view observations which
may give her probable cause to search the entire ship.159 If the boat is a
commercial fishing vessel, the warden can conduct a full, warrantless in-
spection to discover fishing violations."6
III. A Reasonableness Standard for Game Searches
Their combined administrative and police search powers make game
wardens effective law enforcement officers. Although these expanded
powers advance the state's interests, they may also intrude on the privacy
interests of the individual. The effect of this expansion of power may be
152. E.g., CAL. FISH & GAME CODE § 1006 (Deering 1976); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 12,
7053 (1984); W. VA. CODE § 20-7-4(3) (1981).
153. A state's authority over ocean waters extends three miles from its coast. People v.
Weeren, 26 Cal. 3d 654, 607 P.2d 1279, 163 Cal. Rptr. 255, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 839 (1980);
accord Shipman v. Dupre, 88 F. Supp. 482 (D.S.C. 1950).
154. See, eg., Prochaska v. Marcoux, 632 F.2d 648 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S.
984 (1981).
155. 462 U.S. 579, 589 (1983).
156. Id.
157. Some states may, however, permit full warrantless inspection of even noncommercial
crafts without probable cafise. See, eg., CAL. FISH & GAME CODE § 1006 (Deering 1976).
158. See, eg., Hill v. State, 238 So. 2d 608, 611 (Fla. 1970).
159. E.g., Hill, 238 So. 2d at 611; see also United States v. Raub, 637 F.2d 1205 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 922 (1980).
160. See, eg., United States v. Kaiyomaru No. 53, 699 F.2d 989 (9th Cir. 1983); Raub, 637
F.2d at 1210; People v. Di Bemardo, 79 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 5, 144 Cal. Rptr. 902 (1978).
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to give the individual greater constitutional protection from the police
than from game wardens. The individual could be left with a greater pri-
vacy expectation in a crowded city than in the solitude of the wild. This
ironic result underscores the need for constitutional analysis and defini-
tion of game wardens' expanded search powers.
In New Jersey v. T.L. 0., 161 the Supreme Court articulated a search
and seizure standard which provides a framework well suited for consti-
tutional analysis of game searches: the reasonableness standard. "Where
a careful balancing of governmental and private interests suggests that
the public interest is best served by a Fourth Amendment standard of
reasonableness, [this Court has] not hesitated to adopt such a stan-
dard." '162 Although T.L.O. is thus far limited to school searches,163 its
reasonableness standard lends itself to game wardens' searches. Adop-
tion of the T.L.O. rationale would provide a sound constitutional frame-
work for game searches.
Application of the T.L.O. reasonableness standard to a particular
search requires two levels of inquiry. The first question is whether the
standard applies to a particular search. The reasonableness standard ap-
plies only to those warrantless searches in which the government inter-
ests outweigh the individual interests involved.1" The second question
is whether the search was executed in a reasonable manner.165  The
search is reasonably executed if it is justified at inception and reasonably
related in scope to the circumstances which initially justified the
search. 166
161. 105 S. Ct. 733 (1985). At issue in TL.O. was the authority of school officials to search
students. A school official, suspecting that a student had been smoking in violation of school
rules, searched a student's purse for cigarettes. The search revealed marijuana and evidence of
the student's involvement in drug sales. Id. at 737. The New Jersey Supreme Court ruled that
the search was unreasonable because the contents of the student's purse were unrelated to the
accusation that she was smoking, that the official had no reasonable suspicions, and that the
evidence found did not justify the extensiveness of the search. Id. at 738 (citing State ex reL
T.L.O., 94 N.J. 331, 347, 463 A.2d 934, 942-43 (1983)). The state appealed on the grounds
that the exclusionary remedy applied by the state court should not be available against public
officials not engaged primarily in law enforcement. The Supreme Court did not reach this
question. Id. at 738-39. The Court held the Fourth Amendment applicable to school officials,
id. at 741, but it held that the important state interests in education and academic discipline
justified abandonment of the probable cause standard in favor of a reasonableness standard, id.
at 743-44. Under this standard, a search is reasonable if based on reasonable suspicion and
conducted in a reasonable manner. Id. Finding the search at issue reasonable both at incep-
tion and in execution, the Court reversed the state court's decision. Id. at 746-47.
162. Id. at 748-49 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
163. Id. at 736, 744 n.7.
164. Id. at 742-43.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 744.
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A. Applying the Reasonableness Standard to Game Searches
1. Does the Reasonableness Standard Apply?
To determine whether the reasonableness standard applies to game
searches, it is necessary to consider the competing interests involved. A
state has a strong interest in preserving wilderness areas and the wildlife
that thrives there.16 7 Many species of wildlife are in danger of extinc-
tion. 6 ' Wildlife habitats are under ever increasing threat. 169 Much of
the damage to natural resources is caused by those who violate fish and
game statutes as well as other laws.170 Fish and game law enforcement
is therefore an essential element in combatting the threat to the wild.
Balanced against the state interests are the individual's Fourth
Amendment right to privacy and her interest in using wildlife areas.171
Authorities differ as to how much privacy an individual can reasonably
expect in wilderness areas. Some consider the game search a "minimal
intrusion," placing little importance on the outdoorsman's expectation of
privacy.171 Others argue that an individual does not surrender her pri-
vacy expectations merely because she enters a government park.173 Still
others contend that an individual's expectation of privacy is increased by
the isolation afforded by nature. 74 Any search of the person or effects of
an individual is a severe violation of the subjective expectation of pri-
vacy.1 75 Yet hunters and fishermen themselves implicitly accept the no-
167. Baldwin v. Montana Fish and Game Comm'n, 436 U.S. 371, 392 (1978) (Burger, C.J.,
concurring). See also Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 337 (1979); United States v. Green-
head, Inc., 256 F. Supp. 890, 893-94 (N.D. Cal. 1966); Betchart v. Department of Fish and
Game, 158 Cal. App. 3d 1104, 1106-07, 205 Cal. Rptr. 135, 136 (1984).
168. In 1971, forty-three species were on the endangered species list of the California De-
partment of Fish and Game. By 1980 the number had grown to sixty-three. CALIFORNIA
STATE DEPARTMENT OF FISH AND GAME, AT THE CROSSROADS: A REPORT ON CALIFOR-
NIA'S ENDANGERED AND RARE FISH AND WILDLIFE 2, 6 (1980).
169. Id. at 4.
170. State v. Howard, 411 So. 2d 372, 375 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982). See also NARCOTICS
REPORT, supra note 8, at 13.
171. United States v. Munoz, 701 F.2d 1293, 1298 (9th Cir. 1983).
172. Tourtillott, 289 Or. at 859, 618 P.2d at 430. See also W. RINGEL, supra note 4,
§ 14.3(d), at 14-30.
173. Munoz 701 F.2d at 1298. See also State v. Odam, 40 Or. App. 551, 595 P.2d 1277
(1979) (where no checkpoint had been established, officer's detention of automobile without a
"reason to believe" there was game violation violated detainee's Fourth Amendment privacy
expectation).
174. See Note, United States v. Villamonte-Marquez: Administrative Customs Stops-Ran-
domness Is Reasonable on Inland Waters, 4 PACE L. REv. 753, 776-77 (1984) (greater expecta-
tion of privacy on boats because of greater isolation). Note, Search and Seizure-Limitations
on Closed Container Searches in Open Fields-United States v. Ramapuram, 17 WAKE FOREST
L. REv. 478, 493-94 (1981) (greater expectation of privacy in a rural area than in an urban
area).
175. T.L.O, 105 S. Ct. at 741-42.
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tion that they have a lesser expectation of privacy. By fulfilling the
longstanding requirement of obtaining licenses, they acknowledge the
prospect of at least some governmental intrusion into their activities.176
There remains the question of how to "strike the balance"' 77 be-
tween the legitimate interests of citizen and state. T.L. 0. found the war-
rant requirement unsuited to the school environment because its
application would interfere with essential disciplinary measures.' 78 The
requirement may also be unsuited to fish and game law enforcement. As
education depends on discipline and compliance with academic rules, so
conservation depends on compliance with fish and game law. Fish and
game wardens are charged with ensuring compliance. The game inspec-
tion is an important aspect of fish and game law enforcement. 179 A
search warrant requirement would frustrate wardens' inspection pow-
ers. 180  Game wardens, like teachers, must act swiftly to enforce the
rules. The nature of the wilderness environment-the brevity of war-
den/suspect contact, the absence of fixed routes over which offenders
might travel, the distances over which observations must be made, and
the remoteness from conventional law enforcement facilities and magis-
trates who could issue warrants-would hamper wardens' efforts to ob-
tain warrants before investigating possible game violations. Accordingly,
the strict warrant requirement should not apply to game searches. Be-
cause the state interest in environmental protection weighs so heavily
against individual privacy interests, game searches, like school searches,
require "easing of the restrictions" '' which ordinarily govern searches
by the state.
A number of factors suggest that the reasonableness standard
should not apply to game searches. The Court was careful to limit the
T.L. 0. standard to school searches. 8 2 Furthermore, in each of the sepa-
rate opinions, the majority,8 3 Justice Powell,'" 4 Justice Blackmun,"s5
and Justice Brennan8 6 were careful to distinguish between a teacher,
176. Betchart, 158 Cal. App. 3d at 1110, 205 Cal. Rptr. at 138.
177. T.L.O., 105 S. Ct. at 743.
178. Id.
179. Betchart, 158 Cal. App. 3d at 1109-10, 205 Cal. Rptr. at 138. See also Tourtillott, 289
Or. at 858, 618 P.2d at 430.
180. Tourtillott, 289 Or. at 858, 618 P.2d at 430. See also W. RiNGEL, supra note 4,
§ 14.3(b)(1), at 14-14.
181. T.L.O., 105 S. Ct. at 743.
182. Id. at 744 n.7.
183. Id. at 740.
184. Id. at 748 (Powell, J., concurring).
185. Id. at 749-50 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
186. Id. at 751 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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whose "focus is, and should be, on teaching and helping students," and a
police officer, who has "the training [and] the day-to-day experience in
the complexities of probable cause."' 87 Wardens, like police officers, are
often trained and experienced: 18 8 one cannot justify a lower probable
cause standard for game searches on the grounds that wardens are unfa-
miliar with law enforcement. Yet game wardens can be distinguished
from police officers because of the special state interest they serve-envi-
ronmental protection. As Justice Brennan pointed out: "The undifferen-
tiated governmental interest in law enforcement is insufficient to justify
an exception to the warrant requirement. Rather some special govern-
mental interest beyond the need merely to apprehend lawbreakers is nec-
essary to justify a categorical exception to the warrant requirement."' 18 9
Environmental protection is just such an interest. Thus, when wardens
act in the interests of the environment they should be held to a lower
probable cause standard. At times, however, the warden acts in the in-
terests of general rather than environmental law enforcement. 190 At
these times, wardens should be held to the more conventional search
standard. 191
Some authorities have supported application of a reasonableness
standard to game searches by analogizing them to another type of search
to which the reasonableness standard has been applied-the border
search. 192 Border Patrol officers are thinly spread over unpopulated ar-
eas and are faced with many difficulties in policing immigration viola-
tions. 19 These difficulties have been used to justify stops based on a
suspicion standard rather than on a probable cause standard. 194  Game
wardens operate in similarly unpopulated areas and face similar enforce-
ment difficulties. 195
Whatever the individual's privacy interests, the state interest in envi-
187. Id. at 750 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
188. See, e.g., CAL. FISH & GAME CODE §§ 856, 878 (Deering 1984); LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 56:108H (West Supp. 1984).
189. T.L.O., 105 S. Ct. at 751 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
190. See supra notes 20-22 and accompanying text.
191. See infra text accompanying note 215 (proposing guidelines for enforcing nongame
law).
192. E.g., Tourtillott, 289 Or. at 854-58, 618 P.2d at 428. See also United States v. Cortez,
449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981) (roving stop by Border Patrol justified by "particularized" suspicion);
United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 563 (upholding right of Border Patrol to make
stops at fixed checkpoints without any showing of suspicion).
193. Comment, Immigration Roving Border Patrols: The Less Than Probable Cause Stan-
dard for a Stop, 10 AM. J. CRIM. L. 245 (1982).
194. Cortez, 449 U.S. at 417-19.
195. Tourtillott, 289 Or. at 866, 618 P.2d at 434.
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ronmental preservation, like the state interests in favor of education196
and border security,1 97 should prevail. To abuse the privilege of using
the wilderness is to degrade and destroy it. The abuser destroys not only
her own ability, but every person's ability to enjoy the privacy of the
outdoors. To protect the solitude of the wild, the outdoorsman must be
prepared to suffer the minor privacy intrusions occasioned by game
searches. If today's grasslands are to know the footsteps of tomorrow's
children, the states must take strong measures to counter the threats
posed by criminal activity in the wilderness.
2. Is the Search Reasonably Executed?
If the reasonableness standard is to be applied to game searches,
then the execution of those searches must be reasonable under the T.L. 0.
standard. Two factors determine whether a search is reasonably exe-
cuted: first, the action must be justified at inception; second, the search
must be reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified
it. 198
The reasonable search must be justified at inception. 199 Because the
need of educators to maintain order outweighs the privacy interests of
students, the T.L.O. search need only be justified on a showing of reason-
ableness rather than probable cause."°° In the school search context, the
reasonableness standard is met when there are reasonable grounds to be-
lieve that the search will reveal evidence that the student is or has been
violating the law or school rules.2 0 ' A game search would be justified at
its inception if the warden had a reasonable suspicion that her search
would discover evidence of a game violation.
Even the suspicion requirement may not be absolute when applied
to game wardens.2°2  In United States v. Villamonte-Marquez z°3 the
Supreme Court held that customs officials could stop and board ocean-
going vessels at random to inspect registration and licenses. The Court
justified its suspension of the suspicion requirement by pointing out the
problems of law enforcement at sea: it is difficult to check the registra-
tion of sea-going vessels without boarding them, and it is still more diffi-
cult to monitor these ships because of their freedom of movement and the
196. See T.L.O., 105 S. Ct. at 743.
197. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878-79 (1975).
198. TL.O., 105 S. Ct. at 744.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 743-44.
201. Id. at 744.
202. Id. at 744 n.8.
203. 462 U.S. 579 (1983). See supra notes 155-156 and accompanying text.
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absence of fixed routes.2" Consequently, the Court sacrificed the privacy
interests of shipowners and crews in favor of the important state interest
in fighting smugglers.2 °5
By analogy with Villamonte-Marquez, game wardens may also be
able to justify random stops. As with ships, it is difficult without inspec-
tion to tell whether a hunter is licensed. Movement in the wilderness is
nearly as unrestricted as movement at sea; the hunter is not physically
confined to specific routes or roadways. The difficulties of effective game
law enforcement justify suspension of the suspicion requirement in game
searches. The state interest in permitting the warden to inspect licenses
and game containers without reference to artificial standards of suspicion
may outweigh the hunter's interests in hunting and in privacy.
Wardens' inspection powers are further analogous to those of the
Border Patrol. Border Patrol officers, like game wardens, can make stops
based on articulable suspicion rather than probable cause.20 6 The Border
Patrol's "roving" stops may not be conducted at random but must be
supported by reasonable suspicion. 07 At fixed checkpoints, however, the
privacy expectation of the driver is reduced so that random stops are
permissible.20 8 Similar standards have been applied to game wardens.20 9
The second T.L.O. factor for determining whether a search is rea-
sonably executed is scope. The search must be reasonably related in
scope to the circumstances which initially justified the stop.210 The
Supreme Court has not applied this limitation strictly. In T.L. 0., a
school official checked a girl's purse for cigarettes. Even though he
found the cigarettes, he continued the search, ultimately discovering ma-
rijuana and evidence that the student was involved in drug selling.
2 "
Even though a search designed to uncover evidence of smoking at recess
revealed evidence of narcotics trafficking, the Supreme Court found the
search reasonably related in scope to the circumstances justifying the
204. 462 U.S. at 589-90.
205. Id. See also Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 562 (no suspicion required for immigration
searches at fixed checkpoints).
206. Cortez, 449 U.S. at 417.
207. Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 273 (1973).
208. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 566 (1976).
209. Random stops by game wardens have been overturned in roving patrol situations.
United States v. Munoz, 701 F.2d 1293 (9th Cir. 1983). On the other hand, wardens have been
permitted to make random stops at fixed checkpoints. Tourtillott, 289 Or. at 845, 618 P.2d at
423.
210. T.L.O., 105 S. Ct. at 744.
211. Id. at 745-47.
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investigation.212
The result in T.L. 0. suggests that courts applying the reasonable-
ness standard may validate game searches which uncover nongame viola-
tions. This result would further another important state interest-the
need for general law enforcement in rural or wilderness areas. Since
these areas are often under-policed, law enforcement by game wardens
would be valuable. 213 Furthermore, criminal violations can be as envi-
ronmentally destructive as game violations. 214 Consequently, extension
of game searches promotes the twin state interests of wilderness preserva-
tion and general law enforcement.
Although the reasonableness standard can be an invaluable tool for
fish and game wardens, like any tool, it is susceptible to misuse. The
reasonableness standard should therefore be carefully circumscribed in
the fish and game context in order to prevent abuse. Accordingly, the
following section proposes a set of guidelines designed to promote the
efficiency of the fish and game searches while preserving, as much as pos-
sible, the privacy interests of the outdoorsman.
B. Proposed Guidelines for Reasonableness in Game Searches
Applying the TL. 0. reasonableness standard to game searches gives
wardens the flexibility needed to protect the environment and enforce the
law. The reasonableness standard should not, however, become a talis-
man, enabling wardens to circumvent individual constitutional rights.
States should take care to define wardens' search powers so as to give the
wardens needed flexibility in law enforcement with minimal intrusion
into the privacy interests of individuals. Standards for game searches
should encompass the following points.
1. Enforcing Nongame Law
Wardens must be able to enforce nongame law. Protection of the
environment requires enforcement of all law. Further, many of the areas
patrolled by game wardens need general law enforcement officers. 215 In
enforcing nongame law, however, wardens should be subject to the same
limitations as other peace officers. The rationale for expanded warden
212. Id. The Burger Court reads this exception more broadly than the Warren Court. In
Terry, for instance, the purpose of the search was to discover weapons. Accordingly, the scope
of the search was limited to a pat down of the outer garments. Terry, 392 U.S. at 30.
Although the Terry approach suggests that the game search should be limited to discovery of
game law violations, the T.L.O. approach does not imply such a limitation.
213. See NARCOTICS REPORT, supra note 8, at 16.
214. Id. at 13. See supra notes 27, 170 and accompanying text.
215. See supra note 213 and accompanying text.
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search power is the state interest in environmental protection. Since po-
licing nongame law advances that interest indirectly, there is less justifi-
cation for using these expanded inspection powers in nongame contexts.
Wardens should apply these powers only to searches of hunters,
fishermen, and those whom they genuinely and reasonably suspect of
game violations; they should not be able to use these powers to conduct
searches for evidence of nongame violations. Where wardens suspect
criminal violations, they must conduct any investigation under the tradi-
tional, more stringent Fourth Amendment standards. To permit unre-
strained use of the wardens' inspection powers in nongame situations is
to invite abuse. Wardens might otherwise be tempted to use an alleged
game violation as a pretext for an otherwise unlawful search for evidence
of more traditional criminal violations.
2. Licensing
Fish and game laws should require that those engaged in hunting or
fishing be licensed. This requirement is neither burdensome nor novel;
fish and game licensing is a longstanding practice.2 16 The licensing pro-
cess gives sportsmen notice of state regulation and the likelihood of in-
spection. Thus, while engaging in hunting or fishing, the sportsman
should expect some privacy infringement.
3. License Inspection
Wardens need the power to stop any hunter or fisherman at random.
Wardens should be authorized to examine licenses and to conduct a lim-
ited game inspection. Like the officials in Villamonte-Marquez,217 war-
dens need this ability because it is not readily apparent whether hunters
or fishermen are licensed. It is only the hunter or fisherman who should
be subject to this requirement, not people who are simply out to enjoy the
wilderness. Hunters and fishermen have more limited privacy expecta-
tions, not only because they have surrendered some of their privacy ex-
pectations by obtaining licenses,2 18 but also because they are engaged in
the "high privilege" of hunting or fishing.2 19 Furthermore, hunters and
fishermen are readily identifiable by the equipment they carry.
216. Betchart, 158 Cal. App. 3d at 1110, 205 Cal. Rptr. at 138.
217. 462 U.S. at 579. See supra notes 155-156, 179-181 and accompanying text.
218. See supra note 176 and accompanying text.
219. United States v. Greenhead, Inc., 256 F. Supp. 890, 893 (N.D. Cal. 1966).
144 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 13:119
4. Inspection on Reasonable Belief
As in United States v. Cortez,22° wardens should be able to conduct a
limited game "stop" without the necessity of demonstrating probable
cause. Wardens should be able to stop anyone, not only hunters and
fishermen, if they reasonably believe that the suspect has committed a
game violation. They should be able to conduct limited game inspections
if they reasonably believe they will uncover evidence of a game violation.
As in Cortez, wardens should show some objective grounds to justify
their suspicions. Although this ability would intrude somewhat on indi-
vidual privacy interests, it is an important tool for environmental protec-
tion. The gravity of the threat of environmental abuse and the difficulty
of game law enforcement weigh in favor of this standard.
5. Limited Scope of the Initial Game Inspection
The initial game inspection must be limited in scope. It must be
designed to uncover evidence of game violations. For the initial inspec-
tion, wardens should be allowed to search anything likely to contain fish
or game: game bags, sacks, buckets, ice chests, vehicle trunks, and the
like. They should not be allowed to inspect areas unlikely to hold evi-
dence of game violations, for example, glove compartments, clothing, or
handbags, without showing probable cause. Limiting the areas searched
in an initial game inspection ensures that these inspections will meet the
T.L.O. requirement that warrantless searches be reasonably related in
scope to the circumstances which justify the inquiry.221
6. Expanding the Game Inspection
Wardens should be able to expand their limited game inspections to
full searches under some conditions. If, during the course of a limited
game inspection, a warden discovers evidence which gives her probable
cause to believe that a criminal or game-related violation has occurred,
she will be justified in expanding her search. The search would not vio-
late individual rights because it meets the Fourth Amendment require-
ment of probable cause.2 2
220. 449 U.S. 411 (1981). See supra notes 192-195 and accompanying text.
221. T.L.O., 105 S. Ct. at 744.
222. See Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730 (1983) (plurality opinion); Coolidge v. New Hamp-
shire, 403 U.S. 443, 465 (1970). See supra notes 128-134 and accompanying text (discussing
plain view doctrine).
Fall 1985] SEARCH POWERS OF FISH AND GAME WARDENS 145
Conclusion
Because of their dual roles as policemen and administrators, fish and
game wardens have extensive warrantless search powers. These expan-
sive search powers favor the interests of the state over the interests of the
individual. Game searches subordinate the individual's right of privacy
to the interests of wilderness preservation. This is not as intrusive as it
may seem. The wilderness affords the solitude in which privacy thrives.
Abuse of the wilderness threatens its very existence. Game searches are
designed to curb this abuse. The game warden's powers permit limited
encroachment on a particular privacy interest to protect the greater pri-
vacy interests afforded by nature herself.
Nature, however, is not alone in being subject to abuse. A game
warden's search power is an important and powerful tool in the struggle
to protect the environment, but like all tools it is subject to abuse. There
is a danger that game searches will be used as pretexts for otherwise im-
permissible investigations of nongame crimes. The T.L.O. reasonable-
ness standard, if applied to game wardens, would give wardens necessary
flexibility in protecting the environment, while simultaneously limiting
their authority in other contexts. If the states are to make use of the
reasonableness standard, they must define the warden's search powers to
maximize search efficiency while minimizing the potential for abuse.
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